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Abstract
The pressure on marine renewable resources has rapidly increased over past
decades. The resulting scarcity has led to a variety of different control and surveil-
lance instruments. Often they have not improved the current situation, mainly due
to institutional failure and intrinsic uncertainties about the state of stocks. This
contribution presents an assessment of different management schemes with respect
to predefined constraints by utilizing viability theory. Our analysis is based on a
bio-economic model which is examined as a dynamic control system in contin-
uous time. Feasible development paths are discussed in detail. It is shown that
participatory management may lead to serious problems if a purely resource-based
management strategy is employed. The analysis suggests that a less risky manage-
ment strategy can be implemented if limited data are available.
1 Introduction
Marine fish stocks are under extreme pressure worldwide (FAO 2004; Myers and Worm 2003).
Two divergent but closely related developments are observable (Munro 1999; Pauly et al. 2002).
On the one hand, increasing surveillance efforts, limited entries, or marine protected
areas are established for mitigating overfishing, whilst on the other hand the fishing
industry can be sustained at an economic level only by high amounts of subsidies from
the public sector (Mace 1996; Banks 1999; Gre´boval and Munro 1999). This is, in par-
ticular, remarkable since there has been an awareness of these problem for decades and
most fisheries are subject to management measures. The general situation in marine
capture fisheries can be characterized by the following statements:
• Several authors argue that research as well as management instruments are overly
biased toward the ecological viewpoint, while economic driving forces or the role
of political decisions are rarely considered (Lane and Stephenson 2000; Davis and Gartside 2001).
• Fisheries are per se associated with inherent uncertainty which is related to the
partial opaqueness on both the ecological and the economic systems (Whitmarsh et al. 2000).
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• It is often mentioned that model approaches used to provide policy advice are
based on unrealistic basic assumptions and/or inappropriate methodological con-
cepts (cf. Imeson et al. 2003).
However, one-sided views, distinct sources of vagueness, and unsuitable assessment
techniques not only restrict what can be modeled, but, they also impose severe limi-
tations regarding the explanatory power of the results. Thus, the basic question con-
cerning the possibilities for a sustainable development in fisheries still remains: How
can we manage fisheries in a way that avoids “hazardous developments”? Recently,
so-called co-management schemes have been introduced in order to mitigate the con-
sequences of fishery mismanagement, but currently systematic assessments of control
schemes regarding their effectiveness are rarely employed. Considering this situation,
it seems impossible to define safe management options for fisheries.
One focal point of our examination is the inability to anticipate exactly what will
happen in the future of fisheries and marine stocks. Thus, we do not strive to de-
termine “optimal paths” for the co-evolution of fisheries and marine resources, but
rather for desirable corridors1. These corridors are constrained by measures repre-
senting our knowledge of what should at least be avoided in order to achieve sustain-
ability or prevent catastrophic developments (for an example from climate research,
cf. Petschel-Held et al. 1999). We make use of these ideas by applying viability the-
ory, which was developed by Aubin (1991), because it enables us to formally define
the corridor boundaries. Such an analytical strategy allows to provide knowledge for
decision-making, although constraints are normative and an outcome of public discus-
sions. In addition, it shifts attention from the whole set of options to a constrained
set of options, leaving space for adjustments acceptable in political frameworks. Ad-
ditionally, we have combined the viability approach with game-theoretic assumptions
about the socio-economic mechanisms constituting typical management frameworks.
The management schemes we are analysing are an issue of the current debate and are
discussed briefly in the next paragraphs.
Without any regulation it is likely that in the future fish stocks will be further
depleted, as long as overexploitation is profitable for the individual fisherman. The
revenues from catches are private, while the costs induced by a reduced resource
stock are shared between all participants in the fishery (tragedy of the commons, cf.
Hardin 1968). Competing fishing firms base their decisions on deployable capital,
necessary efforts, and on the observed state of the target species (see dashed core in
Fig. 1A,B). The latter is rather critical, because the catch is commonly used as an es-
timator for the abundance of biomass. This situation changes when a management
authority introduces measures imposing restrictions on the fishery (e.g. on gear type,
allowable catches, amount of effort, etc.). Such limitations change the decisions made
by fishing firms (top-down management, cf. Fig. 1A). Nevertheless, in many cases
the results are disappointing, because restrictions are perceived as constraining eco-
nomic opportunities. Thus, fishing firms act as opponents to management authorities,
often resulting in illegal landings or mis-reported catches (Agnew 2000; Hollup 2000;
Robbins 2000; Jensen and Vestergaard 2002). Moreover, scientific stock estimates are
often not as reliable as required. Hence, when a fishery reaches a state of crisis, sci-
entific institutions come under pressure in the public debate, i.e. for putting too much
1The conceptual ideas how these corridors can be used for policy advice and how judicious
strategies for the management of development processes shall be designed, have been discussed in
e.g.Schellnhuber and Kropp 1998. Inverse techniques (target-oriented approaches), such as viability anal-
ysis, solve many analytical problems posed by the intricacy of the policy-bioeconomic complex.
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Figure 1: Sketch of management schemes in fisheries: (A) Top-down strategy: a sci-
entific organization collects data from fishing firms and own scientific trawls and esti-
mates the stock size. Resulting reports are delivered to the management authority for
decision support. The authority imposes restrictions on the fishing firms. (B) For a
co-management a fishery council is introduced, in which representatives from science
and the fishing industry negotiate for appropriate catch or effort restrictions. If they
agree the resulting plan is provided to the management authority, who approves it. An
unmanaged fishery is represented by the dashed cores. Here the firms calculate their ef-
forts independently and only related to the current stock status (measured by the catch
from the previous years, etc.).
stress on conservation objectives and neglecting economic sustainability.
One solution to avoid these shortcomings is offered by co-management schemes,
i.e. by including fishing firms in the decision-making process (Jentoft et al. 1998;
Noble 2000; Charles 2001; Potter 2002). If fishermen are involved in the decision-
making process, it is assumed that economic objectives will complement conserva-
tional goals of governmental organizations. It is the aim of this strategy that all actors
in marine capture fisheries participate actively with respect to the overall target to keep
the utilization of marine resources sustainable. Self-governance within a legal frame-
work constituted by governments is a basic principle of this strategy. As a result, the
fishing industry represents economic objectives in a negotiation process with agents
pursuing conservational goals. Before such a situation comes into play, a variety of
conflicts often have to be resolved, e.g. conflicts over who owns and controls access,
how policy and control mechanisms should be carried out, or conflicts between local
stakeholders (for a nomenclature of common conflicts in fisheries, cf. Charles 1992).
Typically, this type of management is exercised via a fishery council where the repre-
sentatives of fishing firms, processing firms, scientific institutions and policy negotiate,
e.g. about the total allowable catch for each different species. This plan has to be
approved by a governmental authority and is executed by a management organization
which operates in close collaboration with local fishermen (see Figure 1B). A plausible
conjecture is that under co-management fishermen will show higher compliance with
the resulting constraints (cf. Pinkerton 1989; Mahon et al. 2003).
However, an additional problem occurs if management regimes consider only bi-
ological measures as steering targets. Such a strategy has been claimed as ’ichthy-
ocentrism’, indicating that scientific advice puts too much emphasis on the resource
itself (the various fish stocks, in particular their biomass) (Lane and Stephenson 2000;
Davis and Gartside 2001) compared with efforts to examine the behaviour of the re-
source users, their economic settings, and aims. In such a case, the management suc-
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cess cannot depend on an exact stock assessment, which is impossible, due to insuffi-
cient measurement and sampling methods.
Our study applies viability analysis in order to assess different management schemes
in marine fisheries. Recent studies have shown that this methodology is valuable
for determining completely unacceptable outcomes and defining judicious measures
for mitigation (Petschel-Held et al. 1999; Moldenhauer et al. 1999; Bene et al. 2001;
Aubin and Saint-Pierre 2006). Therefore, we try to find out how management in fish-
eries should be designed under defined constraints in order to achieve safe limits.
Pursuing this goal we have defined a model, including stock dynamics as well as
economic and political decision-making. We motivate the viability constraints and
use the catch recommendations of the scientific institution participating in the co-
management process as control variable. The viability criteria are imposed on the
model in order to assess and develop different control strategies. A discussion of the
results and a summary concludes the paper.
2 The Dynamic Model
The basic state variable of the model is the biomass of a fish stock x, which is influ-
enced by the total harvest h in the fishery. If we introduce a recruitment function R
which assigns the growth of the biomass to a given stock, we obtain
x˙ = R(x)− h
as ODE for the stock dynamics. As usual, R is assumed to be of the Schaefer type
(Schaefer 1954), producing logistic growth with maximum R¯ at xMSY and R(0) = 0.
∀x ∈ [0, xMSY ] : R(x) > 0 and DxR(x) > 0,
where Dx denotes the differential operator with respect to the argument x. For x >
xMSY we have DxR(x) < 0. Due to the complexity of ecosystems (embedding of
target species into several food webs, large scale impacts such as ENSO, etc.) we have
to deal with limited knowledge about the behaviour of a fish stock. Thus, no additional
assumptions about R are introduced.
The next step is to determine the amount of total harvest h. In the presented model
we concentrate on output-management, i.e. the negotiation process is about the allo-
cation of catch quotas qi to groups of fishing firms i = 1, . . . , n. We assume that it
is profitable for each firm to realize a harvest which it is allowed to catch. Thus, the
resulting total harvest is h =
∑
i qi. To model the negotiation process a game theoretic
approach can be applied where the fishing actors agree on particular limits for harvest
and the allocation of efforts (cf. Scheffran 2000). Expanding this approach, a scientific
institution and representatives from the fishing industry “bargain” for the total harvest
h and the individual quotas qi. When these pressure groups agree on an allocation, the
result is transformed into practice by the management authority. It is further presumed
that the negotiations are opened by the scientific institution, which makes a recommen-
dation r ≥ 0 for the total catch. Each group of the fishing industry tries both (i) to get
a share as high as possible of the total harvest h and (ii) to increase h above the catch
recommendation r in order to improve their profits.
The optimal quota and optimal increase h − r may differ among the groups, e.g.
due to their capitalization or technical efficiency (artisanal vs. industrial fishery). But,
there is also a trade-off between higher profits resulting from higher quotas and devi-
ation costs di imposed by exceeding the scientific recommendation. These costs are
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linked to the legitimation of bargaining positions challenging the scientific advice and
increasing transaction costs of fierce negotiations (time, expertise, human and social
capital, data retrieval, public relations, etc.). How strong this trade-off is, depends i.a.
on reputation, the political influence and the availability of information – all of which
may differ between the pressure groups. We further assume that the fishing groups act
myopically, which is realistic if the influence of single fishing firms on the resource is
neglectable (Banks 1999; Kropp et al. 2004) and if they push their representatives for
higher quotas. This entails that they only account for short-term deviation costs. My-
opic behaviour can also be observed if the burden of long-term responsibility is shifted
to the scientific institution (allowing fishing firms to reduce subjective uncertainties).
We denote the profit of a group i as pii. It depends on the quota qi and the available
amount of fish x (which is the same for all fishing firms). This function also represents
the efficiency of boats, fishing gear, technological equipment, etc. In a situation without
deviation costs, the function has the form
pii(qi, x) = p qi − ci(qi, x).
The first term represents revenues on markets, where p corresponds to the market price
(which is assumed to be exogenous), while ci is a cost function, assigning variable costs
to a realized harvest qi. It is economically reasonable to assume that ci is increasing in
qi, since more labour, time, fuel etc. is needed for a larger catch. On the other hand,
costs are decreasing in x due to higher densities of fish. Each firm individually selects
catch qi to obtain an optimal profit for a given price and target species. However, in a
co-management framework the profit function is modified by deviation costs:
pii(qi, x) = pqi − ci(qi, x) − di
( n∑
j=1
qj − r
)
.
It should be noted that the deviation costs not only depend on the individual decision
qi, but also on the quota allocated to the other pressure groups. If
∑
j qj − r becomes
negative, we assume that di vanishes, since deviation costs do not apply if the sum of
all quotas is below the scientific recommendation. It is reasonable to presume that each
di is a monotonic increasing function.
Now, the Nash equilibrium of the negotiation process is given by a quota allocation
which assigns an individual quota qi to each group i that maximizes pii with respect to
qi for given p, x and the quotas of the other participants. The resulting total harvest is
the sum of all quotas. By applying basic calculus it is shown that all pii are concave
and continuously differentiable with respect to qi. Solutions of the equation system
∀i = 1, . . . , n : Dqipii = 0
are such negotiation equilibria.
In the following analysis we restrict this general approach to the case of two specific
fishery groups and provide a possible functional specification for variable and deviation
costs:
ci(qi, x) :=
αiqi + βiq
2
i
x
.
di(q1 + q2 − r) :=
{
0 if q1 + q2 < r
κi(q1 + q2 − r)
2 otherwise .
The parameters αi, βi, κi (i = 1, 2) are not completely known, but positive.
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First assume that we are in the case of non-vanishing deviation costs. If x is positive
and since qi ≥ 0 the resulting profit functions pii are continuously differentiable and
concave with respect to q1, q2. Thus, the Nash equilibrium (for given p, x, r) is obtained
by solving
Dq1pi1 = p−
α1 + 2β1q1
x
− 2κ1(q1 + q2 − r) = 0,
Dq2pi2 = p−
α2 + 2β2q2
x
− 2κ2(q1 + q2 − r) = 0,
for q1, q2. The latter equations define a total (binding)2 harvest
hb(x, r) = q1 + q2 =
upx+ wxr − v
β1β2 + wx
, (1)
where
u :=
1
2
(β2 + β1) > 0,
w := β1κ2 + β2κ1 > 0,
v :=
1
2
(α1β2 + α2β1) > 0.
The binding harvest varies according to
Drhb =
wx
β1β2 + wx
> 0, (2)
and
Dxhb =
vw + (up+ wr)β1β2
(wx + β1β2)2
> 0 . (3)
If the catch recommendation r is so high that it is not profitable for fishing firms to
exceed it, then no deviation costs apply in the Nash equilibrium. This special case
κi = 0 results in a total harvest (associated with a non-binding recommendation)
hn(x, r) =
upx− v
β1β2
=: rˆ(x). (4)
Thus, for r ≥ rˆ(x), we have h = hn(x, r), i.e. the industry catches voluntarily less fish
than recommended and therefore, no deviation costs apply. For r < rˆ(x) the harvest is
h = hb(x, r). Summarizing we obtain the total harvest function3
h(x, r) =


hb(x, r) if r ≤ rˆ(x) and hb(x, r) ≥ 0,
hn(x, r) = rˆ(x) if r ≥ rˆ(x) ≥ 0,
0 if rˆ(x) ≤ 0,
0 if 0 ≤ r ≤ rˆ(x) and hb(x, r) ≤ 0.
(5)
2The two cases considered here comprise binding and non-binding recommendations. The former indi-
cates that the achieved harvest is exactly constrained by the recommendation, the latter that the harvest is
lower than the recommendation, i.e. the industry catches – voluntarily – less than suggested.
3There are two additional specific cases that have to be considered (cf. Eq. 5: h(x, r) = 0). If rˆ(x) ≤ 0,
it is not profitable to cast for fish, even if there were no deviation costs, and therefore h = 0. If 0 ≤ r ≤
rˆ(x), but hb(x, r) ≤ 0, the recommendation is so tight that it prevents commercial fishing activities.
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Figure 2: Negotiation equilibrium of the quota setting game. q∗
1
and q∗
2
denote the opti-
mal catch for both groups if there were no management (i.e. deviation costs di ≡ 0). In
this case the choice of the groups is independent from each other (indicated by dashed
lines), and will result in the equilibrium E0. By introducing a catch recommendation
r all points to the upper right of the diagonal are associated with positive deviation
costs. Therefore, the optimal choice of each group depends on the choice of the other
(indicated by solid lines) and results in the equilibrium E1.
We remark that
hn(x, r) = hn(x, rˆ(x)) = rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)). (6)
As hb is monotonically increasing in r while hn is independent from recommendations,
we find
r > rˆ(x) ⇒ hn(x, r) < hb(x, r), (7)
r < rˆ(x) ⇒ hb(x, r) < hn(x, r), (8)
and conclude that always
h(x, r) ≤ rˆ(x). (9)
Equality is only possible if non-binding recommendations are made (r ≥ rˆ(x)). Oth-
erwise, the result of the negotiation process is below the harvest which would be eco-
nomically optimal in the case of absent deviation costs (cf. Fig. 2). Since additionally
Dxhn = Dxrˆ =
up
β1β2
> 0, (10)
the total harvest h is increasing (not strictly) with an increased abundance of fish (sup-
posing the recommendations are unchanged).
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3 Viability Constraints for Sustainability
To answer the question whether a fishery described by this model can be managed
in a sustainable way or not, it is necessary to specify this objective in more detail.
Generally, sustainability can be characterized by ecological, economic, and social di-
mensions. Here, we concentrate on the first two and facilitate their formalization in
the framework of viability theory (Aubin 1991). Viability constraints characterize an
acceptable sub-region of the phase space. A time evolution of a system is called viable
(or sustainable) if it remains in this region indefinitely. If a development process is
controlled, in the examined case by the harvest recommendation r, we want to analyse
whether a control strategy keeps it viable or not.
The choice of viability constraints cannot be purely justified by empirical consid-
erations, because it involves value-laden normative settings (e.g. on what is at least
acceptable or what do we want). The viability concept allows evaluation of different
normative settings with respect to their consistency and consequences, for instance,
whether a given management framework admit controls which satisfy the constraints.
For our examination of marine fisheries two reasonable viability constraints are de-
fined and investigated. We deduce conditions under which a control rule for r exists,
respecting both constraints at the same time:
1. Ensure that the biomass of a stock resides always above a minimal level x > 0,
i.e.
∀t : x(t) ≥ x.
2. Require that a minimum total harvest h > 0 can always be realized or exceeded,
i.e
∀t : h(t) ≥ h.
This harvest covers fixed costs in the fishery, guarantees a minimum level of
employment, or sustains food safety.
In the following, we refer to the first criterion as “ecological” and to the second one as
“economic” viability. The viability problem is introduced more formally as follows.
Let F (x) denote the set of all derivatives x˙ which are admissible in x, e.g. F (x) :=
{R(x)− h(x, r) | r ≥ 0 andh(x, r) ≥ h} for all changes of fish stocks resulting from
an economically viable harvest recommendation r. An interval I = [x,∞] is called a
viability domain of F if
∀x ≥ x : F (x) 6= ∅ andF (x) ∩ [0,∞] 6= ∅. (11)
The viability theorem (Aubin 1991, p.91) states that if I is a viability domain of F ,
then for every initial value x0 ∈ I there exists a control path r(·), such that the solution
of the initial value problem
x˙(t) = R(x(t)) − h(x(t), r(t)) ∈ F (x),
x(0) = x0,
remains in I , i.e. ∀t ≥ 0 : x(t) ∈ I (more technical premises of this theorem can be
found in Aubin (1991)).
In the following we determine criteria for I being a viability domain, depending on
given values of x and h. For such values a “wise” harvest recommendation can keep
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the fishery within economic and ecological sustainable limits. If the harvest recom-
mendation r is binding then x˙ ≥ 0, if R(x) ≥ hb(x, r) (catch matches recruitment).
The solution of this inequality yields
r ≤
R(x)(wx + β1β2) + v
wx
−
up
w
=: r¯(x), (12)
i.e. a maximal recommendation which results in a negotiation equilibrium for the total
harvest which is low enough to ensure an increasing fish stock. This, however, depends
on the state of the resource, the market, and other economic parameters. Relation (12)
does not necessarily have a positive right-hand side. Since r ≥ 0, it is impossible to sta-
bilize the fish stock in such a case. The maximal recommendation does not necessarily
increase with the fish stock. Differentiating with respect to x yields
Dxr¯ =
wx2DxR(x) + β1β2(xDxR(x)−R(x))− v
wx2
, (13)
where the expression xDxR(x) −R(x) may become negative.
In the case of non-binding recommendations (catch is lower than recommendation)
r ≥ rˆ(x), we need hn(x, r) = rˆ(x) ≤ R(x) for an increasing resource. This condition
does not depend on the concrete value of r.
Due to relation (11) all of the above conditions only have to hold at x = x, and we
can determine the maximal harvest recommendation if R(x) is known. Again, it may
happen that, e.g. due to high prices, this condition cannot be fulfilled. It depends on a
non-trivial relation of economic and ecological parameters, whether the quota negotia-
tion process can yield a viable result. To satisfy the economic viability constraint, r has
to be chosen for every time such that h(x, r) ≥ h. For r ≤ rˆ(x) we solve hb(x, r) ≥ h
for r, yielding
r ≥
h(wx+ β1β2) + v
wx
−
up
w
=: r(x). (14)
Contrary to the former case, we obtain a lower limit for the harvest recommendation.
While the similarity of the right hand sides of Eq. (12) and Eq. (14) is obvious, the
partial derivative with respect to x simplifies to
Dxr = −
hβ1β2 + v
wx2
< 0, (15)
i.e. for larger fish stocks, lower catch recommendations guarantee economic viability.
However, for non-binding recommendations, the condition rˆ(x) ≥ h has to hold for
every x ∈ I .
Combining both viability constraints, we must distinguish whether there is the pos-
sibility to choose r at x = x such that it respects Eq. (12) and Eq. (14) (in the case of
binding recommendations), i.e. r(x) ≤ r ≤ r¯(x), which is equivalent to h ≤ R(x).
Summarizing all possible cases yields (cf. appendix A.1 for the proof):
The interval I = [x,∞] is a viability domain, if and only if
(i) rˆ(x) ≥ r(x), and (16)
(ii) h ≤ R(x), and
(iii) r(x) ≥ 0 or r¯(x) ≥ 0.
Although for the proof (A.1) an awkward set of cases has to be considered, these con-
ditions are easy to interpret. The compatibility of both viability criteria only depends
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on the relation between the recruitment function, the aspiration level for harvest and
the efficiency of the firms. If the recruitment at the minimal viable stock level x lies
below the required harvest, there exists an obvious contradiction between economic
and ecological targets (condition 16ii). In this situation, stock approaches x, the fish-
eries council has to decide whether to sacrifice conservational or harvest objectives.
According to (16i) it is profitable to fish at least h, even if no deviation costs apply.
Otherwise no harvest suggestion guarantees an adequate yield, because the harvest is
always below or equal to rˆ(x). Condition (16iii) can be met, if the recommendations
can reduce the harvest below R(x) in case the stock approaches x. Otherwise, a rec-
ommendation r < 0 would be needed in order to achieve a sufficient harvest reduction
h(x, r) < R(x). However, in our examinations this makes no sense.
4 Assessment of Recommendation Strategies
As long as the system stays in the viability domain it is possible to keep it viable if
an appropriate strategy is selected. However, this does not ensure that every control
strategy is successful. In addition, in a critical state in which the viability constraints
are not satisfied, it is not clear whether a selected strategy leads to ill-management
or forces a fishery back to sustainable limits. Consistently, we examine and assess
the viability of different recommendation strategies in this section. Formally, such
a strategy assigns a value for r to a given system state, i.e. a closed-loop control
according to the following schemes.
• Ichthyocentric control: The harvest recommendation is purely based on an esti-
mate of the stock recruitment.
• Conservative control: The harvest recommendation is based on economic via-
bility in the sense that the minimum harvest h is always realized.
• Qualitative control: In this case, due to uncertainties, recommendations are only
based on qualitative economic and ecological observations.
4.1 Ichthyocentric Control
The first control strategy is called “ichthyocentric”, in order to make clear that the sci-
entific organization considers only the state of a fish stock for their harvest suggestions,
but not the socio-economic conditions. It is assumed that the harvest recommendation
r equals the estimated recruitment of the targeted species and that the scientific institu-
tion is able to estimate correctly the recruitment function, i.e.
r = R(x).
This is a challenging task, since an exact estimation of the stock biomass is bound
to fail, due to unavoidable measurement deficits. However, let us assume that the
estimator is roughly correct. The examination of the ichthyocentric control strategy
shows that even in this ideal case economic viability is not always guaranteed. If
r = R(x) < r(x) the recommendations are too low to sustain a harvest rate h (in
particular, if the fishery stays in a viability domain, cf. Prop. A.2 in the appendix).
The situation is even more dramatic if one focuses on ecological viability. If recom-
mendations r are binding our results show that the catch exceeds r. As a consequence,
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recommending R(x) leads to a catch above recruitment which implies an always de-
creasing fish stock (h(x,R(x)) ≤ R(x), if and only if r = R(x) ≥ rˆ(x), cf. Prop.
A.3).
Ichthyocentric control is only sustainable if recruitment is always large enough to
allow a minimal harvest and if recommendations are not binding at x = x. The latter
means that the realized catch rˆ must be significantly lower than the scientific recom-
mendation, a situation which normally does not occur in industrial capture fisheries.
But it might be observable in low capitalized fisheries, e.g. if the competitors only use
small boats. Otherwise, the stock will necessarily decrease below x. If this is already
the case, the chance for a regeneration of stocks is rather bad until rˆ(x) < R(x) is
approached. On this level the firms voluntarily catch less than recruitment. We can
summarize that even in the case of a perfect stock assessment, the ichthyocentric strat-
egy exposes the fishery to a risky development path.
4.2 Conservative Control
The conservative control strategy aims to ensure that the economic viability criterion
is satisfied, but nothing more: the scientific institution always approves
r = r(x).
To evaluate this strategy the phase space structure of the model must be discussed in
more detail (Fig. 3). We define the fish stock level a by the intersection r(x) = rˆ(x).
It is unique since rˆ(x) is linearly increasing, while r(x) is a monotonically decreasing
function (Eq. 15). If [x,∞] is a viability domain and rˆ(x) ≥ r(x) ≥ 0 (Eq. 16) holds,
it follows that a < x and rˆ(a) = r(a) > 0. We further define the fish stock levels
b < c as the solutions of r¯(x) = r(x). Although r¯(x) is (in general) not monotonic,
this equality only holds if h = R(x) (cf. Eq. 12 and 14). Since the recruitment
function R is of Schaefer type, only a maximum of two solutions can occur. If [x,∞]
is a viability domain, with the consequence that R(x) ≥ h holds (Eq. 16), these two
intersections satisfy b < x < c (the only exception is the marginal case R(x) = h).
We have, in principle, to distinguish the cases a < b and b < a (cf. Fig. 3A,B). We
further observe that limx→0 r¯(x) = +∞, indicating an additional intersection between
rˆ and r¯ below b. For the conservative control scheme the system always evolves along
the graph of the bold straight and dotted line (cf. Fig. 3).
If the fishery stays within the viability domain, we always have r = r(x) ≤ rˆ(x)
(Prop. A.1) and hb(x, r(x)) = h > 0 holds. Consequently, it follows from Eq. (5)
that h(x, r(x)) = hb(x, r(x)) ≥ h, i.e. conservative control guarantees economic
viability in the viability domain. Also, due to the fact that within a viability domain
h(x, r(x)) = h ≤ R(x) is valid, the ecological viability constraint is met. There-
fore, it can be deduced that conservative control is – in general – a viable strategy.
Nevertheless, the following two aspects have to be considered. (i) This strategy only
guarantees a minimal catch level, although a larger harvest might be viable, too (for
x ∈ [x, c]). (ii) Taking into account the deficits in exact stock estimation, it may hap-
pen that the state of the stock is already below x indicating that no viable control exists
anymore, but this fact is unrecognized by the resource users. However, it is of spe-
cific interest whether a stock will recover to a viable level or not if the conservative
control strategy is still exercised in such a situation. Both cases are possible, in some
cases it the stock can recover, but also worser scenarios can occur, e.g. if r(x) ≤ rˆ(x)
(as in the viability domain), but R(x) < h ⇔ r¯(x) < r(x) (cf. Fig. 3A, dotted
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Figure 3: Phase portraits for the conservative control strategy: (A) a < b left, (B) b <
a. Below r a viable harvest cannot be obtained. Solid arrows denote the direction of x,
being positive below r¯ and negative above. Note that it is possible for both cases that r¯
has no zero (then the separated areas below r are joined) or multiple zeros. In addition,
if a < b it might be possible that r¯ becomes larger than rˆ (cf. (A)), then the area above r¯
decomposes into multiple sections which is not shown here, because it does not change
the general statements). The bold and dotted lines correspond to recommending r,
resulting in an increasing (straight) or decreasing stock (dotted). Note that for x < a,
recommending r = r(x) results in the same catch as recommending r = rˆ(x).
line), i.e. recruitment is below minimal harvest and the stock further decreases. An-
other situation is given if r¯(x) < rˆ(x) < r(x) (cf. Fig. 3B, dotted line), where
h(x, r(x)) = rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)) > hb(x, r¯(x)) = R(x).
We conclude that conservative control can satisfy economic and ecological viabil-
ity criteria, but only for non-critical situations (i.e. in the viability domain). In contrast
to the ichthyocentric control scheme, it has the advantage that only qualitative infor-
mation is needed to exercise this type of management, i.e. the scientific institution
only has to supervise whether the realized catch of the fishery is above or below h.
In the former case, catch recommendations should be reduced, while in the latter they
should be increased. This perspective considers the problems arising from uncertainty
in fisheries management more seriously. However, in a crisis (i.e. being outside the
viability domain) where the aspiration level for harvest is too high or the abundance of
the targeted species is rather small for a viable control, we cannot be assured that the
resource recovers by applying this management strategy. But even in the viable case,
profits in the fishery are still limited to a minimum.
4.3 Qualitative Control
The third alternative extends the qualitative view discussed above in order to increase
profits and limit risks in critical situations, i.e outside the viability domain. It is based
only on qualitative observations, which means that the exact numerical values of x,R, r
and r¯ are not known, but that it can be determined correctly whether x is decreasing
or increasing in time, whether the realized catches exceed h or not, and whether rec-
ommendations are binding or not. The applied control rule provides only qualitative
advice, i.e. whether r has to be increased or decreased. The proposed qualitative con-
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Figure 4: Phase portraits for the qualitative control strategy: (A) a < b, (B) b < a.
The numbered areas correspond to situations which can be distinguished qualitatively
and are discussed in detail in the text.
trol strategies are summarized in Tab. 1. To discuss this control scheme in detail, we
Table 1: Qualitative control as discussed in detail in the text. The numbers of rules
corresponds to areas in the phase portrait (cf. Fig. 4). Note that the coat indicates the
history of a fishery (cf. text). In the phase plots they are indistinguishable.
rule no. qualitative observation reaction
(0) r > rˆ(x) decrease r
(1) x increases and h > h increase r
(2) x increases and h < h increase r
(3’) x decreases and h > h and mature decrease r
(4’) x decreases and h < h and mature moratorium: h = 0
(3”) x decreases and h > h and emerging decrease r until h = h
(4”) x decreases and h < h and emerging increase r until h = h
refer to phase space portraits again (Fig. 4). The underlying idea is to combine qualita-
tive observations regarding a fishery with phase plane analysis. This knowledge makes
it feasible to decide in which region of the phase plane a fishery is currently situated.
If sufficient knowledge is available, we additionally use information on the history of
a fishery in order to decide this question. This makes it feasible to classify it either
as emerging, which means that a stock was not exploited considerably before, or we
otherwise nominate it as mature. If a region is determined in this way, an appropriate
control rule can be selected.
Whenever the system stays within the viability domain only the rules (0, partly),
(1) and (3) come into play which warrants that the fishery will remain in the viability
domain. In contrast, if a fishery leaves the viability domain, the rules (0), (2), (3), and
(4) are able to steer the industry back to sustainable limits.
In case of an emerging fishery, we start with a high x (moving from the right to the
left in Fig. 4). In region (3) it could be reasonable to increase r in order to harvest as
much as possible. However, there would be a significant risk to move close to region
(0), possibly without recognizing qualitatively that the stock decreases below x. Such
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a situation can be avoided if the scientific institution strictly follows the conservative
control scheme in an emerging fishery until region (1) is reached for the first time.
Thenceforward we call a fishery mature and catch recommendations can be increased
to improve the profits. Once the fish stock begins to decrease again, we know that we
have approached region (3) and r must reduced to force the fishery back to (1) in order
to stay within the viability domain. Contrary to the emerging fishery, it is not needed
to decrease r until h = h, because the fish stock begins to increase before (region 1).
Now suppose that we are outside the viability domain. This may be a consequence
of, for example, an ill-adapted management scheme which was applied before the co-
management came into play. If the fishery stays in region (2) the scientific institution
shall increase r to obtain at least h as yield. If decreasing stocks and low catches are
observed in a mature fishery (region 4,) by considering the precautionary principle,
we must assume that x < x. In such a case only a moratorium (h ≡ 0) can steer
the fishery back to sustainability. If r¯(x) has zeros and the mature fishery resides
below the smallest zero, an increase of r results in entering region (4) (same situation
as above). As an additional precondition for a safe development, it is required that
recommendations are always binding: once r > rˆ(x), i.e. the fisheries harvest less
than it was recommended r shall be reduced. This prevents that the stock size decreases
below a (cf. Fig. 3). If b < a this guarantees that x approaches the viability domain.
The qualitative control as presented here allows higher profits than for conservative
control, because recommendations are increased above r(x) for max(a, b) < x < c,
which results in higher harvest rates. It is also more secure, because it forces the system
back to the viability domain – even if quantitative observations on the system are not
available.
5 Discussion
The previous analysis shows that participatory co-management schemes are not a pri-
ori viable, since the outcome strongly depends on the relation between biological, eco-
nomic and political factors, and, in particular, on the catch recommendations of the
scientific institution. In the future, is is clear that ill-managed fisheries will radically
reduce the self-determining options of the coming generations in the fishing industry.
The applied viability concept shows how the dangerous effects related to measurement
deficits can be surmounted. In this way, the corresponding uncertainty can be confined
to a minimum by a parallel achievement of management options.
In this contribution we have shown this for the three cases of ichtyocentric, conser-
vative, and qualitative control. An extreme case in this context is a recommendation
strategy which is purely based on the observation of fish stocks. This exposes the
fishery to a high risk of economic and ecological decline. Such a situation can be sub-
stantially improved by designing a more flexible strategy which only needs qualitative
information about the state of the fishery and does not deterministically fix the scien-
tific institution. In addition, it is shown that even for a fishery outside of a viable zone,
there exists a good chance that it can be steered into the safe region if a suitable control
scheme is applied. A disadvantage of the presented model is that it does not take the
costs of change into account, i.e. that rapid changes in harvest recommendations may
induce high adaption or political costs. On the other hand, even under uncertainty the
qualitative control strategy is at least as good as economically conservative control, and
less risky than data-intensive ichthyocentric management.
However, the knowledge regarding relevant processes in specific domains of marine
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fisheries will remain less over the next few decades. Referring to the variety of deficits
in environmental management discussed here, the situation in marine capture fisheries
more explicitly shows that we need additional techniques to enhance our knowledge.
This holds, of course, if we deal with higher-dimensional systems. Here qualitative
simulation offers a possibility of revealing further insights into the phase space struc-
ture under uncertainty (Kuipers 1994). It takes assumptions about the monotonicity
of the right-hand sides of an ODE and generates all temporal sequences of trends and
thresholds which are consistent with the assumptions. The result of such a simula-
tion is a directed graph, where each node represents a region of the phase space (e.g.
the regions (1) to (4) in figure 4), and each edge indicates a possible trajectory cross-
ing the boundary between the associated regions (for recent examples in fisheries, cf.
Eisenack and Kropp 2001; Kropp et al. 2002; Eisenack et al. 2005). By investigating
the subgraph induced by the nodes which represent regions adjacent to the boundary
of a viability domain, we can find out where the system is on the safe side, where it
necessarily degrades, and where the result depends on the control strategy.
6 Conclusions
The situation in industrial fisheries is still facing serious challenges in both an ecologi-
cal and economic sense. Management objectives are rarely achieved in practice and the
debate about adequate management strategies is still ongoing. Since a unique solution
is not expected, there still exists the need for some kind of integrated assessment.
In this paper we presented a new approach in the development and assessment of
co-management regimes. It is based upon the experience that for sustainable fishery
management steering strategies should take diverse uncertainties into account. This is
addressed by extracting some robust system properties, even from weak information,
and by giving an overview of the capabilities of viability theory in sustainability re-
search. It is shown in this paper that the viability of a fishery strongly depends on the
catch recommendations of a scientific institution participating in the co-management
framework. The applied methodology makes it feasible to develop a qualitative control
strategy which requires only little information about the state of the fishery and is less
risky than data-rich management schemes. Of course, this variety of outcomes is not a
general objection against co-management. For the future we will use enhanced models,
including capital and investment dynamics of the fishing firms. We think that such a
strategy not only introduces additional inertia and modified rules for the negotiation
process, but also more flexible steering instruments (e.g. effort control). Summarizing,
we think that such a analytical concept paves the road toward detailed insights into
what happens in marine capture fisheries. We expect similar valuable clues for more
complex models, leading towards an integrated assessment of fisheries, including eco-
logical, economic, and social issues.
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A Propositions and Proofs
PROPOSITION A.1
The interval I = [x,∞] is a viability domain, if and only if
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(i) rˆ(x) ≥ r(x), and
(ii) h ≤ R(x), and
(iii) r(x) ≥ 0 or r¯(x) ≥ 0.
PROOF A.1
We start with some technical remarks: If r ≥ r then hb(x, r) ≥ hb(x, r(x)), since
Drhb < 0. The latter is equivalent to h > 0 which can be shown by basic calculations,
i.e.
hb(x, r) > 0. (17)
In particular, it follows from condition (A.1i) and Eq. (6) that
rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)) > 0. (18)
1. It is shown that I is a viability domain, if the conditions (A.1i-iii) are valid. As
a consequence of the monotonicity of rˆ(x) and r(x) (Eq. 10 and 15) it follows
from condition (i) and from x ≥ x that also rˆ(x) ≥ r(x).
We have to show that ∀x > x ∃ r ≥ 0 : h(x, r) ≥ h and that ∃ r ≥ 0 :
h(x, r) ≥ h and R(x) ≥ h(x, r). We claim that r = max(0, r(x)) respects
these properties.
If r(x) ≥ 0 (condition A.1iii), r = r(x). Then h(x, r) = hb(x, r), due to Eq.
(5), r ≤ rˆ(x), and Eq. (17). By elementary calculations we obtain hb(x, r(x)) =
h. In particular, for x = x, we have hb(x, r(x)) = h ≤ R(x), because of
condition (A.1ii).
If r(x) < 0, by condition (iii), r¯(x) ≥ 0, and r = 0. Then h(x, r) = hb(x, 0)
due to Eq. (5), 0 < rˆ(x), and Eq. (17). Thus, for all x ≥ x: hb(x, 0) ≥
hb(x, r(x)) = h. Moreover, hb(x, 0) ≤ R(x), because this is equivalent to
r¯(x) ≥ 0.
2. Conversely, conditions (A.1i-iii) are a consequence of I being a viability domain,
i.e. ∀x ≥ x ∃ r ≥ 0 : h(x, r) ≥ h > 0 and if x = x additionally h(x, r) ≤
R(x).
It is hb(x, r(x)) = h ≤ h(x, r) ≤ rˆ(x)). The first inequality is valid by assump-
tion, the second due to Eq. (9). Considering Eq. (6) the last term is equivalent to
hb(x, rˆ(x)). Due to a strict monotonicity of hb in r condition (A.1i) follows.
It follows directly from the assumptions that h ≤ h(x, r) ≤ R(x), i.e. condition
(ii).
Now let us suppose that r(x) < 0. Equation (6) and condition (A.1i) obvi-
ously show that rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)) ≥ hb(x, r)) = h > 0. If r ≤ rˆ(x) then
hb(x, 0)) ≤ hb(x, r)) = h(x, r)) ≤ R(x). If r > rˆ(x) then hb(x, 0)) ≤
hb(x, rˆ(x)) = hn(x, rˆ(x)) = hn(x, r) ≤ R(x). Thus, in any case hb(x, 0)) ≤
R(x), which is equivalent to r¯(x) ≥ 0, condition (A.1iii) holds. 
PROPOSITION A.2
If x ∈ I = [x,∞], I a viability domain and consequently r(x) ≤ rˆ(x). r is economi-
cally viable, if and only if R(x) ≥ r(x).
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PROOF A.2
At first we observe that hb(x,R(x)) ≥ hb(x, r(x)) = h > 0 and rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)) ≥
hb(x, r(x)) = h > 0. Thus, if r = R(x) ≥ rˆ(x) it follows (with Eq. 5, 6 and 2) that
h(x,R(x)) = hn(x,R(x)) = rˆ(x) = hb(x, rˆ(x)) ≥ hb(x, r(x)) = h. Also, if
r(x) ≤ R(x) ≤ rˆ(x) then h(x,R(x)) = hb(x,R(x)) ≥ hb(x, r(x)) = h. Contrary, if
R(x) ≤ r(x), then h(x,R(x)) equals 0 < h or hb(x,R(x)) ≤ hb(x, r(x)) = h. 
PROPOSITION A.3
h(x,R(x)) ≤ R(x), if and only if r = R(x) ≥ rˆ(x).
PROOF A.3
If R(x) ≥ rˆ(x), then h(x,R(x)) = hn(x,R(x)) = rˆ(x) ≤ R(x). Otherwise, if
R(x) < rˆ(x) we use the fact that rˆ(x) > r ⇔ hb(x, r) > r (true by elemen-
tary calculations), to see that hb(x,R(x)) > R(x) ≥ 0, and we have h(x,R(x)) =
hb(x,R(x)) > R(x) (by Eq. 5). 
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